Entrypoint drops the capability bounding set and sets no_new_privs. Security docs
and spec no longer claim the agent can't reach the secrets; docker exec fallbacks
use a clean environment. PLAYWRIGHT_ENABLED drops the nested compose default.
Tests pin the Dockerfile's Playwright install step and the compose model fallback.
Status implemented, verification intro rewritten, and a verification record of the final checks (dotnet build/test, both image variants, offline probes of uid, /proc environ and the diagnostics socket, playwright-mcp --version offline, headless Chromium as app, docker compose config, compose start with a fake token -> 401 -> exit 1). Open question 2 (Playwright compose default) marked resolved.
Two-stage build, agent tools, Node 24, claude CLI, data dirs owned by app, DOTNET_EnableDiagnostics=0. Adds the MCP spec's deferred test that the Dockerfile's PLAYWRIGHT_MCP_VERSION equals PlaywrightPreset.DefaultPackage.
Spec change: the image keeps root as its user and the entrypoint drops to app with setpriv. With USER app, compose's docker-init (PID 1) runs as app and its /proc/1/environ exposes every secret to the agent's bash. The spec also lists the csprojs the restore layer copies (GoogleCalendar, Mcp, Scheduler included) and sets HOME=/home/app in the image.
